
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



APPELLANT'S BRIEF & APPENDIX

76-1413

To be argued by DANIEL P. HOLLMAN



United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Docket No. 76-1413

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v

MICHAEL YANNICELLI,

Defendant-Appellant.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT MICHAEL YANNICELLI

DANIEL P. HOLLMAN
27 East 39th Street
New York, New York 10016
Tel. No. (212) MU 9-1844
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

Reid. U.S alivney MRathenburg

10/26/76

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Docket No. 76-1413

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

-v.-

MICHAEL YANNICELLI,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT MICHAEL YANNICELLI

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This is an appeal from a contempt citation of the Appellant who refused to answer questions before a federal grand jury, invoking instead, his privilege against self-incrimination. The contempt citation was ordered by the Honorable Henry F. Werker, United States Court Judge for the Southern District of New York on August 23, 1976.

Indictment 76 CR 377 was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York on February 9, 1976 and named as defendants, thirteen individuals including Appellant herein, MICHAEL YANNICELLI. In essence, the indictment charged the defendants with conspiracy in violation of Title 18, United States Code, 371 and conducting an illegal gambling business in violation of Title 18, United States Code, 1955 and 2. (A35).*

On April 4, 1976, the defendant YANNICELLI pleaded guilty to both counts of the indictment.

Other of the defendants stood trial before the Honorable Robert L. Carter, United States District Judge.

On July 8, 1976, the Court sentenced defendant YANNICELLI to a total term of imprisonment of one and one-half years on each count, to run concurrently, and was fined the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars (\$10,000.00) on Count One and Ten Thousand Dollars (\$10,000.00) on Count Two.

On August 1, 1976, counsel for defendant
YANNICELLI was advised that a Writ of Habeas Corpus

^{*} References preceded by "A" refer to the Appendix:

Ad Testificandum was issued for his client returnable on August 16, 1976. On August 16, 1976, defendant YANNICELLI appeared before the grand jury. He was advised by the federal prosecutor that the government was conducting an investigation into alleged official corruption in Westchester County and alleged income tax evasion by MICHAEL YANNICELLI.

(A25). Rather than testify, defendant YANNICELLI chose to exert his Fifth Amendment privilege.

On August 23, 1976 defendant YANNICELLI was again summoned before the grand jury. This time he was requested to testify regarding the alleged participation of FRANCIS MILLOW in those gambling activities which were the subject of the original indictment, and furthermore, whether YANNICELLI was the supervisor of those gambling activities. YANNICELLI again refused to testify claiming his privilege against self-incrimination. (A30).

At a hearing held on August 23, 1976,
Honrable Henry F. Werker, United States District
Judge, determined that defendant YANNICELLI was
precluded from invoking his Fifth Amendment
privilege by virtue of his plea of guilty to the

original indictment. Judge Werker again asked defendant YANNICELLI if he intended to claim his privilege, and when he acknowledged that he did, he was cited for contempt. (A21).

Upon the application of the government, an order of confinement, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, 1826(a) was signed on August 25, 1976.

(A4). Defendant YANNICELLI was sentenced until such time as he would agree to answer the questions of the grand jury or until the expiration of the grand jury on April 16, 1977, or if the life of the grand jury was extended to a sentence of no more than eighteen (18) months. This sentence is currently being served by defendant YANNICELLI at the Federal Correctional Institution at Danbury, Connecticut. The running of the sentence originally imposed by Judge Carter was interrupted pending completion of the service of the sentence on the contempt violation.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

INTRODUCTION

This case involves the fundamental right

the freedom from being compelled to testify against oneself. Our system of justice is undermined when the government deliberately seeks to avoid the burdens of independent investigation by compelling self-incriminating disclosures. In view of the circumstances described hereinbelow, the defendant YANNICELLI was properly exercising his rights in refusing to incriminate himself of other crimes. It is, therefore, urged that the contempt charge be reversed, and that defendant YANNICELLI be permitted to continue to exert his Fifth Amendment privilege.

I - BACKGROUND

A - The Original Indictment and Plea

On October 29, 1975, FRANCIS MILLOW was called before a grand jury investigating alleged violations of federal gambling statutes by defendant YANNICELLI and others. Apparently, MILLOW refused to cooperate and instead claimed his privilege against self-incrimination. On December 8, 1975 MILLOW was again brought before the grand jury,

however, this time he had been given testimonial immunity pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, 6002.

During the course of his testimony, MILLOW implicated YANNICELLI as a participant in an illegal betting operation which was based primarily in Westchester and the northernareas of Bronx County. In preparing the indictment against YANNICELLI and others, it is apparent that the government relied heavily on MILLOW's testimony.

Indictment 76 CR 377 was filed on
February 9, 1976 and charged the defendants with
conspiracy in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, 371 and conducting an illegal gambling
business in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, 1955 and 2. MILLOW was named as an unindicted
co-conspirator. (A35). On April 4, 1976 defendant
YANNICELLI entered a plea of guilty to Counts One
and Two of the indictment.

B - Subsequent Grand Jury Investigation
On August 16, 1976, appellant YANNICELLI
appeared before a grand jury pursuant to a Writ of

Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum. He was advised he was the target of the investigation, and that the government was looking into police corruption, as well as possible income tax violations committed by YANNICELLI. (A25). Upon advice of counsel, he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. The government does not take issue with YANNICELLI's actions on August 16, 1976.

Thereafter, on August 23, 1976, YANNICELLI was again brought into the grand jury to testify in connection with an investigation into alleged violations of Title 18, United States Code, 1955 by FRANCIS MILLOW. He was asked if he knew MILLOW, if he knew whether MILLOW had ever accepted a policy wager, and whether or not MILLOW had ever worked in a gambling operation supervised by sim. (Emphasis added). To each question, YANNICELLI replied that he desired to claim his privilege against self-incrimination. (A32).

A hearing was then held before Judge Werker to decide if defendant YANNICELLI was entitled to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege. The government claimed that by virtue of having pled guilty

between himself and MILLOW, that YANNICELLI no longer is entitled to refuse to answer these questions. Counsel for the defendant urged that forcing YANNICELLI to testify would be violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege because it would potentially expose him to additional liability. Judge Werker ruled that YANNICELLI must answer the government's questions and cited him for contempt when he refused to do so. (A4). It is this ruling which is the subject of this appeal.

ARGUMENT

POINT I

Defendant was Correct in Exerting His Fifth Amendment Privilege Rather than Risk Exposure to Further Cri inal Liability and Therefore His Conviction Should be Reversed.

A '- The Fifth Amendment Privilege

The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no citizen shall be forced to offer proof of his own guilt (U.S. Const., Amend. V). As Mr. Justice Frankfurter ruled in <u>Ullman v. United States</u>, 350 U.S. 422 (1956). The Supreme Court is duly bound

to give to the self-incrimination clause a liberal construction if we are to keep faith with the patriots who fought for inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution and if we are to acknowlege the great policies and purposes underlying that clause.

A citizen's privilege to refuse to disclose information that would tend to be incriminating was guaranteed by the federal government in the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and extended to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. This privilege also has been recognized as applicable to grand jury proceedings. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).

B - A Plea of Guilty Waives the Fifth Amendment Privilege Only in Relation to the Particular Offense Which is the Subject of the Plea

It is acknowledged that as a general proposition, a plea of guilty waives the privilege against self-incrimination for the particular offense which is the subject of the plea. See, for example, United States v. Cioffi, 242 E2d 473 (2d Cir. 1957) cert. denied, 249 Fd 371. Also,

United States v. Romero, 249 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1957).

C - Government's Questions Need Not be Incriminating in Themselves in Order for the Defendant to Claim his Privilege

which the government asks of the defendant be incriminating in themselves. The courts have held that it is sufficient if the defendant's answers might potentially be incriminating. The widely accepted criterion for determining whether a question is incriminating is whether it might tend to constitute a link in the chain of evidence against the witness, it not being necessary that the question tend directly to incriminate the witness. See, for example, Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950) and Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).

In <u>Shendal v. United States</u>, 312 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1963) a grand jury witness was cited for contempt for refusing to testify. <u>Shendal</u>, a manager at the Sands Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada, had admitted travelling to Chicago to make a "collection" for his employers but refused to

answer questions as to how much money was involved and which individuals directed the operation.

Interpreting Hoffman, the Court stated that:

"... holds that a claim of privilege is good unless the Court can find that any prospective answer could not possibly incriminate or form a link in the chain." Supra. at 565

Just as the Court in Shendal indicated, that his answer to the government's questions might well prove to be the link in the chain connecting Shendal to some federal tax offense. The same must be said for defendant YANNICELLI, in view of the fact that the government has already acknowledged that he is the target of a criminal investigation involving tax evasion. (A25).

D - Requiring the Defendant to Answer These Questions Might Expose Him to Further Criminal Liability

At the hearing on the contempt charge, the government attorney stated:

"I would admit quite obviously if the grand jury started asking into areas such as what Mr. Yanncelli's income from the gambling operation was, that perhaps he would have a legitimate fifth amend --."

At that point, the Court replied:

"Did Mr. Yanncelli ever pay him any money or had he collected any money from Mr. Millow: all of those questions would be subject it seems to me to a fifth amendment privilege."

Those types of questions are obviously incriminating. But, equally incriminating, because it constitutes a link in the chain of evidence in a criminal tax evasion case, is the following question:

"Has Mr. Francis Millow or, as he is commonly known, Pop Millow ever worked in a gamuling operation which has been supervised by you." (A32).

If YANNICELLI were to answer such a question, he would be acknowledging that he was a principal in the gambling operation and that would be more than he admitted in the indictment to which he pled. He would also be exposing himself to a possible federal tax indictment since he had already pled guilty admitting he was a gambler, he would now, by his own compelled testimony, admit he was a supervisor and thus, be responsible for any federal taxes due on his gambling operations. As a result, it is contended that defendant YANNICELLI

was perfectly justified in refusing to answer such a question by exerting his Fifth Amendment privilege.

In <u>United States v. Chase</u>, 281 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1960) two defendants who entered guilty pleas to violations of the Federal Bank Robbery Statute were summoned to testify before a federal grand jury regarding three bank robberies which were the subject of their plea. The defendants exerted their Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to testify. After being sentenced on contempt charges, the defendants agreed to testify in order to purge themselves. Each defendant testified as to his own activities and participation in the bank robberies but refused to identify any other person as an accomplice. The Court again imposed a sentence for contempt.

The Court began by stating that while it is up to the trial judge to determine whether the privilege afforded by the Fifth Amendment is properly invoked, he does not have unlimited discretion and must view the claim for the privilege in light of the rules and decisions of the Supreme Court. The Court here also pointed out that it is

not necessary that the answers called for would, in themselves, support a conviction for a federal crime.

The Chase Court obviously considered the question of whether the defendants' previous conviction acted as abar to their use of the privilege. It stated:

"Of course defendants had immunity as to the offenses of which they had been previously convicted. These were embraced in two sections of the Bank Robbery Act, but there were additional sections of that Act under which they had not been prosecuted."

Accordingly, the Court held that the defendants had not waived and were still entitled to exert their Fifth Amendment privilege.

This was also the case here. In addition to the previously mentioned tax liability,
YANNICELLI might still potentially be prosecuted on other gambling statutes such as interstate transmission of wagering information Title 18,
United States Code, 1084, interstate or foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises, defined to include gambling, Title 18,

United States Code, 1952 and interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia, Title 18, United States Code, 1953. Furthermore, if YANNICELLI were compelled to testify that he was a supervisor of a gambling operation and, thereafter, evidence of police corruption to protect this gambling operation should be developed, YANNICELLI's admissions of supervision could readily implicate him in the corruption case.

E - The Defendant May Invoke his Privilege Even if There is Only a Slight Possibility of Further Prosecution

The government has acknowledged that there are a number of investigations currently being conducted by this grand jury (A25). YANNICELLI has been called before them for three separate investigations, two of which he has been designated as a target. This factor alone indicates that there is more than just a potential of further criminal liability involved here. Consequently it is urged that YANNICELLI should not be forced to testify even if the government were to claim that there existed only a slight possibility of further prosecution.

In <u>United States v. Miran*</u> 253 F.2d 135 (2nd Cir. 1958), defendants who had been convicted of conspiracy were called before a grand jury convened to investigate intimidation of witnesses in the other alleged conspirators' trial. The defendants refused to testify and invoked their privilege against self-incrimination. The defendants here had not been originally prosecuted for the substantive crimes involved, and although the government urged that as a practical matter, a second prosecution was not likely, the Court pointed out that it was not absolutely barred either. Thus, the Court said that:

"... We are thus faced with the novel question whether or not a witness can invoke his privilege against self-incrimination where practically there is only a slight possibility of prosecution." Supra at 139.

In upholding the right of the defendants to exert their Fifth Amendment privilege even where it appeared that the government would not prosecute, it was stated that:

"We find no justification for limiting the historic protections of the Fifth Amendment by creating an exception to the general rule which would nullify the privilege whenever it appears that the government would undertake to prosecute."

Supra at 139

The Court in <u>Miranti</u> concluded by stating that, "... the Constitution is for the dispicable as well as for the admirable", supra at 141. See also <u>United States v. Johnson</u>, 488 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir. 1973).

F - The Government's Need for Information Does Not Outweigh the Defendant's Right to His Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

In recent years, we have witnessed that the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment privilege has come in conflict with governmental need for information. Traditionally, the Court has held for the right of the individual to maintain his Fifth Amendment privilege. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) are representative of this type of case. These cases involved the imposition by the government of an occupational and excise tax on gambling (Title 26, United

States Code, 4411 and 4412). The Supreme Court held that the disclosures required of gamblers in connection with these taxes were likely to compel self-incrimination and, therefore, were violative of an individual's rights under the Fifth Amendment.

The occupational tax cases are relevant to the defendant's present situation in another significant way. If defendant YANNICELLI were forced to answer the government's question relating to his supervisory role in this matter (A32), he would not only be admitting more than he pleaded to originally in the indictment but he would be exposing himself to a federal tax evasion indictment. Several cases involving payment of the occupational tax make it clear that there is distinct difference in terms of those who are engaged in gambling who have a proprietary interest (the so-called "bankers" for example) and those who do not (the so-called "pick-up men" or "runners" for example). U.S. v. Cooperstein, 221 F.Supp 522 (D.C. Mass. 1963) and U.S. v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351 (1957).

G - The Defendant's Motives for Invoking the

Privilege are Immaterial so long as he is Entitled to Assert It.

United States v. Ward, 314 F.Supp. 261

(E.D. Louisiana, 1970) was a criminal contempt proceeding growing out of a defendant Ward's refusal to testify against his former co-defendant Hodges.

Ward, who had previously pleaded guilty to the charge that Hodges was now on trial for, claimed his privilege against self-incrimination when he was asked the following questions.

"Mr. Ward, when was the last time you saw Mr. Hodges." Supra at 263.

Among other things, the government urged that Ward was not seeking the privilege for his own protection but merely to shield his friend Hodges. Citing United States v. Courtney, 236 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1956), the Court here stated:

"... it is firmly established that a witness' motives are immaterial so long as he is entitled to assert it in his own behalf in any event."
Supra at 264

The Court in <u>Ward</u> found in favor of the defendant's right to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination. They held that despite Ward's plea of guilty further testimony by him could still

incriminate him by leading to disclosure of facts essential to his conviction of related federal and state crimes which had not been admitted by his quilty plea.

The questions which were asked of defendant YANNICELLI were even more potentially incriminating than that asked of Ward. In this matter, there is also a greater likelihood of prosecution. With the knowledge that several grand jury investigations are already being undertaken, of which YANNICELLI is the target of, at least two investigations, it is clear that questions and answers concerning his supervisor capacity over gambling operations would be incriminating.

POINT II

The Defendant Should Not Have Been Subjected to Coercive Civil Contempt.

A - Title 28 of United States Code, § 1826

When defendant YANNICELLI continued to exert his privilege against self-incrimination after being informed by Judge Werker that it was no longer

available to nim, YANNICELLI was cited for contempt under Title 28, United States Code, 1826. Recently this statute was the subject of a controversy before this same district court.

In the Matter of a Witness Harvey Johnpoll (United States District Court M11-188) decided by Judge Brieant on July 16, 1976 involved a defendant convicted on a counterfeiting charge who refused to testify in a subsequent investigation of the matter. Here the defendant was granted "use immunity" under Section 6002 of Title 18, United States Code in connection with his appearance but he still refused to testify.

The Court in Johnpoll stated that:

"Title 28 of the United States Code, §1826 declares the inherent power of a common law court in relevant part as follows:

"§1826. Recalcitrant witnesses

(a) Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States refused without just cause shown to comply with an order of the court to testify . . . the court, upon such refusal, or when such refusal is duly brought to its attention, may summarily order his confinement at a suitable place until such time as the witness is willing to give such testimony or provide such information. No period of such confinement shall exceed the life of --

(2) the term of the grand jury, including extensions, before which such refusal to comply with the court order occurred, but in no event shall such confinement exceed eighteen months." (Emphasis added).

statute does not, nor could compel the Court to confine s. n a recalcitrant witness. The is ue is addressed to the Court's discretion and judgment, not to the wishes of a prosecutor. Perhaps as common law judges, we will best preserve our cherished institutions by exercising the power of coercive civil contempt against recalcitrant grand jury witnesses sparingly and with compassion, not against all contemnors. Rather, we should imprison only where on all the surrounding facts such vast power must be applied to vindicate society's rights and aid the proper functioning of the grand inquest in cases where it is essential to do so." Supra at 1(a) & 13.

It is submitted that such is not the case in this instance. Rather, YANNICELLI should be permitted to invoke his Constitutional safeguards,

and avoid incrimination.

POINT III

It is Unfair for Appellant to Appear as a Target and Witness Before the Same Grand Jury.

On August 16, 1976, the appellant was advised that he was a target of two investigations. one involving police corruption and the other tax evasion. The grand jury was to determine whether sufficient evidence would be established to indict appellant for these crimes.

Seven days later, appellant was called before the grand jury in a new capacity, that of a witness compelled to testify. One of the first things that was established before the grand jury was that he was a convicted felon having pled guilty to the indictment referred to herein. If the government is to be sustained in its position, then appellant would have to further testify to not involving his activity in gambling operations, his associations, and the method in which he does business. Thus, the same grand jury is in a

position where they may indict appellant and also receive evidence of his prior conviction. (A30) In addition, they will receive compelled testimony which they may well consider with regard to the return of any indictment against appellant. It is noteworthy that the Assistant who presented these matters to the grand jury, did not give them any type of cautionary instructions on August 23, 1976 that they were not to consider this testimony with regard to YANNICELLI's previous appearance as a target. It is submitted that a cautionary instruction would not have corrected this clearly prejudicial procedure.

Any grand jury that is impanelled under Rule 6, of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or one that is impanelled under any other federal authority, should not receive testimony that is clearly prejudicial and which precludes them from judging a target's culpability on the merits.

While the government may argue that YANNICELLI has no position to raise this issue until he is indicted, it is submitted that such a procedure admits to a violation of a person's rights who

abpears before the grand jury and leaves the ability to correct such serious infractions in the hands of the government prosecutor. The government may well argue if no indictment is returned there has not been any violation of appellant's rights. Obviously, appellant's right to a grand jury free of bias and prejudice has already been violated. A grand jury, if it is to proceed fairly, must not be in a position of determining whether there is substantial evidence to indict him, and further hear evidence of his previous criminal record, as well as his compelled testimony involving his criminal activities.

CONCLUSION

In view of the foregoing, it is requested that defendant YANNICELLI be released from the service of the remainder of his sentence under Title 28, United States Code, 1826. Further, it is urged that the time which defendant

YANNICELLI has already served be applied to the sentence imposed by Judge Carter on the original indictment.

Respectfully submitted,

Daniel P. Hollman 27 East 39th Street New York, New York 10016 Tel. No. (212) MU9-1844 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Docket No. 76-1413

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

-v.-

MICHAEL YANNICELLI,

Defendant-Appellant.

On Appeal From The United States District Court For the Southern District of New York

APPENDIX

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DOCKET ENTRIES

M19-97 WIRETAP, etal TITLE 18 SECTION 2518

DATE	FILINGS-PROCEEDINGS
61	Aug. 17-76 Filed one brown envelope ordered sealed containing Application and Sealing Order and placed in vault in Rm. 66. WERKER, J.
61	Aug. 17-76 Filed one brown envelope ordered sealed containing 25th Day Report and placed in vault in Rm. 66. CONNER, J.
64	Aug. 17-76 Filed one brown envelope ordered sealedcontaining 15th day report and placed in vault in Rm. 66 to be sealed and unsealed only at direction of the Court. MacMAHON,J.
61	Aug. 20-76 Filed one brown envelope ordered sealed and placed in vault in Rm. 66to be sealed and unsealed only at direction of the Court. CONNER, J. (containing application & sealing order).
61	Aug. 20-76 Filed one brown envelope ordered sealed and placed in vault in Rm. 66 postponement of notice to be sealed and unsealed only at direction of the Court. CONNER, J.
63	Aug. 25-76 Filed one brown envelope ordered sealed and placed in vault in Rm. 66 (order & affdvt.)to be unsealed only at the direction of the Court. WERKER, J.
63	Aug. 26-76Filed one brown envelope ordered sealed and placed in vault in Rm. 66 (30th day and final report) to be unsealed only at the direction of the court. WERKER, J.

DATE :

FILINGS-PROCEEDINGS

- Aug. 27-76-- Filed one brown envelope ordered sealed and placed in vault in Rm. 66- (10 day report) -- to be unsealed only at the direction of the Court. GOETTEL, J.
- 63 Sept. 2-76-- Filed Notice of Appeal from the final judgment of conviction ordered by the Hon. H.P. Werker, USDJ for SDNY, on 8-23-76. M/n Robert Fiske, U.S.Atty., SDNY: and Michael Yannicelli, MCC,1 St. Andrews Plaza, N.Y., N.Y. 10007

U.S.C.A. 10..... CASE NO. M-19- 9 STOR HEW 8-2-76 A T F CO Y

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DATE.

Freed transcript dalest 9-27-76

A 3

UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NOT YORK

MICHAEL YANNICELLI SECOND CIRCUIT

CASE NO. 19-97

ENTERET OF DECK T ENTREES.

DATE

PROCEED TEGS

10-20-76 Fired stipulation that certain Grand Jury minutes be unsealed & added to the record on appeal.

10-20-76 Filed order that certain Grand Jury Minutes be released for transmission to U.S.C.A.

specific to

ORDER OF COURT CITING FOR CONTEMPT AUGUST 25, 1976

A 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

----X

IN RE MICHAEL YANNICELLI,

ORDER

A WITNESS BEFORE THE

M 11-188

GRAND JURY

IT APPEARING to the satisfaction of the Court:

- 1. That on April 27, 1976, the witness, MICHAEL YANNICELLI, entered a plea of guilty before the Honorable Robert L. Carter, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, to Indictment Number S76 CR. 377, attached as Exhibit A, which charged him, interalia, with conspiring with Francis J. Millow and others to violate Title 18, United States Code, Section 1955.
- 2. That on July 30, 1976, a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum was issued which ordered the Warden of the Federal Correctional Institution at Danbury, Connecticut, to produce

the witness, MICHAEL YANNICELLI, before a grand jury empaneled in this District so that he could testify in connection with an investigation being conducted by the New York Joint Strike Force

3. That on August 23, 1976, the witness, MICHAEL YANNICELLI, was brought before the aforesaid grand jury and advised that the grand jury was investigating Francis J. Millow's role in the unlawful gambling operation that was described in the indictment to which the witnest, MICHAEL YANNICELLI, had pled guilty on April 27, 1976; that the witnes, MICHAEL YANNICELLI, refused to testify before the aforesaid grand jury about Francis J. Millow's role in the unlawful operation on the ground of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; that despite this Court's ruling that because of his guilty plea to Indictment Number S76 CR. 377, the witness, MICHAEL YANNICELLI, could not refuse to testify on the ground of his Fifth Amendment privilege, the witness, MICHAEL YANNICELLI, continued to refuse to testify on that ground; and application having been made by the Government on

August 23, 1976 for an order of confinement pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 1826(a), and the Court being satisfied that the witness, MICHAEL YANNICELLI, has refused unlawfully to testify before the said grand jury with full understanding of his obligation to testify, it is hereby

ordered that MICHAEL YANNICELLI be committed to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States at the Metropolitan Correctional Center, New York, New York, until such time as he is willing to testify before said grand jury or until the expiration of the term of said grand jury (April 15, 1977, subject to an eighteen month extension), whichever first occurs, but said confinement in no event to exceed eighteen months.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that said confinement shall interrupt the two one and one half year federal sentences presently being concurrently served by MICHAEL YANNICELLI, which sentence was imposed on July 8, 1976 by the Honorable Robert L.

Carter, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, for violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371 and 1955, and which sentence shall not resume until the confinement directed by this Order is terminated.

Dated: New York, New York August 25, 1976

(Henry F. Werker)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT REPORTERS U.S. COURTHOUS FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK, N.Y. CO 7-4580

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MR. ABZUG: Your Honor, may I just make some preliminary introductions. I am Michael Abzug from the Strike Force. Seated to my right is Mr. Mel Winter. He's a grand jury reporter. Seated next to him is Thomasina Amarino. She is our grand jury forelady. This is Mr. Dan Hollman. He is an attorney that represents the grand jury witness in this case, Mr. Yancelli.

Your Honor, if I just may briefly recite the facts in this case. In February of 1976 the witness before you now, Mr. Yanncelli, was indicted by a grand jury impanelled in this district for violating Title 18 United States Code Section 1955 which, as you know, is the statute which prohibits unlawful gambling operations. in conspiring to do so in violation of Title 18 United States Code 371.

of the conspiracy indictment, the grand jury charges that Mr. Yanncelli conspired with 12 other named defendants and a number of unindicted co-conspirators, among which was an individual by the name of Francis J. Millow.

Mr. Millow was an unindicted co-conspirator.

Subsequently the matter was assigned to Judge Carter on --

Incidentally, I have a copy of the indictment

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for your inspection if you wish. It has been marked into evidence at the grand jury as grand jury Exhibit Number 1.

Subsequently, the matter Web assigned to Judge Carter, and on April 27, 1976, two months after the indictment, Mr. Yanncelli pled guilty to both counts of the indictment which has been marked into evidence as grand jury Exhibit Number 1. I have the transcript of that plea with me, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Hollman, is there any question that Mr. Yanncelli pled to both counts of this indictment?

MR. HOLLMAN: There is none.

MR. ABZUG: Today Mr. Yanncelli was brought into the grand jury to testify in connection with the grand jury investigation into alleged violations of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1955 by Mr. Millow, the unindicted co-conspirator named in this indictment.

On Friday, last Friday, I called Mr. Hollman to advise him of the nature of the grand jury inquiry.

Mr. Hollman as you see, appeared today. I advised

Mr. Yanncelli that the grand jury -- of the scope of the grand jury investigation. I advised him of his Constitutional rights, and I asked him a number of questions

pertaining to his relationship with Mr. Millow.

by the grand jury reporter, but to my recollection I asked him, "Do you know Mr. Millow?". He refused to answer on the grounds of his fifth amendment privilege.

I asked him within the past five years does he know whether Mr. Millow ever accepted a policy wager. Again, he refused to answer on the grounds of his fifth amendment privilege. And I asked him, finally When did he begin or when did Mr. Millow begin working in the gambling operation which he supervised. Mr. Yanncelli refused to answer on the grounds of his fifth amendment privilege.

that by virtue of Mr. Yanncelli's having pled to the indictment which describes the relationship between him and Mr. Millow, that Mr. Yanncelli no longer has a fifth amendment privilege to assert to refuse to answer questions pertaining to Mr. Millow's unlawful activities with respect to the gambling operation charged in this indictment; and I respectfully invite the Court's attention to a circuit case, captioned "United States versus Caesar Romero," R-o-m-e-r-o, cited at 249 Federal Section 371 at page 375 in which the Second Circuit rules that once a witness has been convicted for a transaction in

question, as I submit Mr. Yanncelli has been here, he no longer is able to claim the privlege of fifth amendment, and may be compelled to testify.

I submit, your Honor, under the authority of that case that Mr. Millow -- excuse me -- Mr. Yanncelli has no fifth amendment privileges to assert, and this Court should compel him to testify.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: May I see the copy of the indictment, please.

MR. ABZUG: The opinion?

THE COURT: The indictment. I will listen, Mr. Hollman.

MR. HOLLMAN: The issue is whether or not Mr. Yanncelli has the right to invoke his Constitutional privilege, and that is the right to refuse to testify on the grounds that it may tend to incriminate him of some Federal crime.

What Mr. Abzug has neglected to mention is that this grand jury has at least two other additional investigations going on, including the one involving Mr. Millow, for potential conspiracy to violate the gambling laws.

One is as a result of the indictment

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Mr. Yanncelli pled to at the time Mr. Abzug accepted the plea and Judge Carter accepted the plea.

There are allegations concerning police corruption in Westchester County.

Mr. Yancelli has been brought before this grand jury to testify whether or not he knows anything about police corruption.

More important, from Mr. Yanncelli's point of view, he is also potentially subjected to a possible indictment for income tax evasion. Obviously, asking him a quistion as Mr. Abzug did before the grand jury — When did Mr. Millow work for you?"— while Mr. Yanncelli supervised the gambling operation, would be something clearly within the realm of a potential income tax violation because of Mr. Yanncelli exercising a supervisaltype of capacity.

Mr. Yanncelli is a asserting his privilege not based on his prior plea, but the potential other indictment, if they can develop the case, either on tax evasion or police corruption.

Mr. Yanncelli certainly has the fifth amendment privilege, the right to refuse to answer, otherwise he's going to be placed again before this Court and be

convicted possibly on his own statements before the grand jury.

This is not what the grand jury was impaneled to do.

On that basis I submit to your Honor he has every right to assert his privilege on the grounds that he's a target of this investigation and has been told he is a target of this investigation.

THE COURT: Mr. Abzug?

MR. ABZUG: Your Honor, our response to that is quite simple. There are a number of investigations that this grand jury is conducting. One of them is the police-corruption aspect that Mr. Hollman mentioned.

Mr. Yanncelli was brought before a grand jury last week with Mr. Murty, and asked questions pertaining to that particular investigation.

Mr. Yanncelli refused to answer those questions, and that refusal was respected by the Government.

The questions that he is now being asked are distinguishable, I would submit, from those which might incriminate him with respect to a possible indictment, stemming from the allegations of the police corruption in Westchester County; and that therefore I would submit that Mr. Hollman's objections are somewhat irrelevant.

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The question before your Honor, the questions that
are being asked by the grand jury are limited in scope.

They pertain only to Mr. Millow, and I think that if the
grand jury's inquiry is restricted to Mr. Yanncelli's
relationship with Mr. Millow, and not in any way getting

into the area of police corruption --

THE COURT: How about income taxes?

MR. ABZUG: Well, the questions can be narrowly framed so that -- well, I would submit that the mere fact that Mr. Yanncelli might admit that Mr. Millow is working or is associated with him in the gambling operation which is mentioned in the indictment does not necessarily or can not -- is not incriminating to him in the income tax sense.

I would admit quite obviously, if the grand jury started asking into areas such as what Mr. Yanncelli's income from the gambling operation was, that perhaps he would have a legitimate fifth amendment --

any money or had he collected any money from Mr. Millow; all of those questions would be subject it seems to me to a fifth amendment privilege.

MR. ABZUG: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Also, I would say this. I don't

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know when this indictment was filed. It does not show on its face. It must have been some time

MR. ABZUG: It was February 9, 1976.

THE COURT: So that your questions must be limited to the framework with respect to at least Count 1 from September 1, 1968 to the date of the indictment, and with respect to the second count of the indictment from on or about April 15, 1971 until the date of the filing of the indictment.

MR. ABZUG: If I understand your Honor's direction, perhaps the way we can resolve this is this: when Mr. Yanncelli reappears before the grand jury, the grand jury will limit its questions specifically to Mr. Millow's activity without reference to whatever his relationship might have been with Mr. Yanncelli. The grand jury may ask questions as to Mr. Millow's relationship with other people charged in the indictment, but not Mr. Yanncelli. That way we will insulate Mr. Yancelli from testifying with respect to any activities directly involving himself.

MR. HOLLMAN: Your Honor, I would object to that. If the grand jury is going to ask Mr. Yanncelli whether or not Mr. Millow is engaged in gambling operations, and deletes his name, Mr. Yanncelli is going to say yes

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to that, that is part of the web that is going to incriminate him of some kind of Federal violation and probably income tax evasion because he's going to be aware of a gambling operation going on of which Mr. Millow is a part and the obvious inference to be drawn from that is that Mr. Yanncelli also is a part of it since he's aware of it.

type of deletion of his name. He's going to admit to knowledge that he knows about a gambling operation.

I submit, if anyone has a fifth amendment privilege, it is certainly him.

THE COURT: I suggest Mr. Yanncelli might plead to the conspiracy charge and the other charge in this indictment; he has already admitted knowing a gambling operation was going on, so it is absurd to say at this particular juncture the Government is not already investigating him for income tax avoidance or evasion, and so forth and so on.

MR. HOLIMAN: I submit --

missions as to participation of Mr. Millow or other named or unnamed conspirators, it seems to me, would not enlarge or infringe upon the rights of Mr. Yanncelli.

MR. HOLLMAN: I submit to your Honor that it

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would show that he is part of a gambling operation; that he has knowledge thereof.

THE COURT: He has admitted that.

MR. HOLLMAN: It will show he is responsible for the taxes not paid.

THE COURT: The same thing would be true as of this date because he has admitted to the two charges in the indictment.

MR. HOLIMAN: He has not admitted to being the principal, a person in charge. He has not.

THE COURT: If he is not a principal, if he has not given any directions, then he does not have to say anything. He has admitted being a principal to the conspiracy.

MR. HOLLMAN: He has admitted to being nothing more than one of 13 people and I don't think all 13 people will be charged with tax involvement but only the principals thereof: and, if Mr. Yanncelli admits anyway that he is directing Mr. Millow or knows of his activities or receives money from Mr. Millow or directed him to run the activities, then he has gotten himself involved with tax evasion.

THE COURT: They are entirely different things With respect to meetings with Mr. Millow or directing

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Mr. Millow to do certain things, etc etera. Those things I will direct Mr. Yanncelli to answer, but not with respect to the collection of any monies.

He's an intelligent man. He's got a right to make up his mind as to whether one thing or another. If he decides during the course of the grand jury investigation that a question is one that would not be permitted by the Court under this direction, then he has every right to say to Mr. Abzug, "Mr. Abzug, I will claim my fifth amendment privilege on that matter, and I would like the question to be referred to the Court."

MR. HOLLMAN: It seems to me that the Government last week -- they had an investigation in Westchester County concerning police corruption. Unsuccessful in having Mr. Yanncelli testify last week in that type of investigation, they now decide the way they will do it is selecting Mr. Millow as a target, and therefore force Mr. Yanncelli to avoid taking his fifth amendment privilege.

I think it is a blatant abuse of Mr. Yanncelli's Constitutional privileges, and I'm going to advise him to take fifth amendment privileges in connection with any connection he has with Mr. Millow. I don't see how he's going to get himself into anything but another indictment.

THE COURT: If you advise him to do that, then

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I will have no alternative but to commit him until such time as he answers or until the date of the expiration of this grand jury, whichever is sooner.

MR. HOLIMAN: Let me see what the questions are.

MR. ABZUG: The questions, the initial questions will be the first three questions, in any event, that were asked, that which you just took the fifth amendment privilege.

MR. HOLLMAN: One of them I know suggests Mr. Yanncelli supervised Mr. Millow, which certainly provides him with a certain amount of evidence.

THE COURT: He can say, "I did not supervise him." All he has to do is answer it, "I did not supervise it.", if that is the truth.

MR. HOLIMAN: Certainly then there may be other evidence that indicates it is not the truth, and therefore he will be subjected to admissions before the grand jury. It will be used against him in an income tax-evasion case.

THE COURT: He will be subjected to perjury if it is not the truth.

MR. HOLLMAN: That is why he wanted to exercise the fifth amendment privilege.

THE COURT: Everyone wants to exercise the

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fifth amendment privilege because they are afraid of
perjury. I am telling you, in my opinion, there is
nothing in those three questions which would not be con-
tained within the framework of this indictment; and I am
directing Mr. Yanncelli to answer those three questions.

If you are asserting his fifth amendment privilege as to those three questions, I will remand him to the Marshal.

MR. HOLLMAN: Your Honor, I think based on my understanding of what his rights are, and not at all to _ suggest your Honor is wrong, I would like the opportunity to appeal your Honor's decision here and see if I can't get a clarification of the Court of Appeals.

THE COURT: You can do that anytime you wish.

In the mean time Mr. Yanncelli is going to be committed.

MR. HOLLMAN: All right.

THE COURT: Mr. Yanncelli, do you understand?

MR. YANNCELLI: Yes, your Honor.

that you will assert your fifth amendment privilege to the three questions that Mr. Abzug asked you initially before the grand jury: and is that your wish?

MR. YANNCELLI: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: You understand that if you persist

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in that assertion of a fifth amendment privilege under the circumstances that you have pled guilty to this indictment, I have no alternative but to commit you until such time as you will answer those questions or until the expiration of the grand jury; which is when?

MR. ABZUG: April 16, 1977, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you understand that,

Mr. Yanncelli?

MR. YANNCELLI: Yes, your Honor.

MR. ABZUG: Your Honor, just so the record in clear, I think it might be useful if the reporter read the first three questions into the record.

THE COURT: Would you read the first three questions and responses?

MR. WINTER: Yes, your Honor.

Mr. Yanncelli, do you know an individual by the name of Francis J. Millow?

I refuse to answer.

Do you know an individual by the name of Pop Millow?

I refuse to answer.

Do you know whether in the past five years Pop Millow or Mr. Francis Millow has ever accepted a policy wager?

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"A I refuse to answer

"O Has Mr. Francis Millow or, as he is commonly known, Pop Millow ever worked in a gambling operation which has been supervised by you?

"A I refuse to answer."

THE COURT: There were four questions: and

I will direct Mr. Yanncelli to answer those four questions.

As I understand it, from him and from you, Mr. Hollman, he refuses on his fifth amendment privilege basis?

MR. HOLLMAN: That's correct, your Honor. He does.

MR. ABUZG: Your Honor, in the light of
Mr. Yanncelli's refusal, the Government moves for an
order committing him to the custody of the Marshal until
such time as he agrees to comply with your Honor's order.

The Government also will, if your Honor directs, draft up an order which will modify your Honor's direction that he be remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal, and that the sentence that he serves while he is in the custody of the Marshal should run consecutively with the sentence that he is currently serving that was imposed upon him by Judge Carter as a result of his plea of guilty to the indictment that your Honor has before you.

MR. HOLLMAN: I would suggest, your Honor, that that part of the sentence will probably be illegal because he can be sentenced up until a term of the grand jury, which I gather is April 16, 1977.

Mr. Abzug seems to be suggesting Judge Carter's sentence be served, and then assuming Mr. Yanncelli was led out in 1978 under Judge Carter's sentence, then he would start with the grand jury sentence which I think is clearly unfounded in the legal sense.

MR. ABZUG: What I am suggesting is what the Court has done in the past, which is simply hold the running of Judge Carter's sentence which was imposed on June 8, 1976. The sentence that was imposed was an 18 month sentence -- two 18 month sentences, one on each count, plus a \$20,000 fine until such time as Mr. Yanncelli agrees to comply with the Court's order.

MR. HOLLMAN: I don't know --

THE COURT: I think that is legal for me to do: and I will so do that.

The defendant is remanded.

THE MARSAHLL: How about the writ?

MR. ABZUG: It is not satisfied.

Excuse me, on the record, there is a question about just satisfying the writ. The writ I imagine will

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remain unsatisfied until Mr. Yanncelli agrees to comply with Judge Werker's order.

serve a sentence that I have imposed as of this time, as of now, so that the writ is unsatisfied until such time as his sentence is completed; and he will remain in the MCC for that period of time under my sentence.

MR. ABZUG: Thank you, your Honor.

GRAND JURY TESTIMONY OF APPELLANT AUGUST 23 1976

UNITED STATES GRAND JURY

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

- - **- -** - - -

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

-v-

FNU (DIORIO)

- ^

United States Courthouse Foley Square New York, New York

August 16, 1976 2:10 p.m.

MICHAEL D. ABZUG, ESQ.,

Special Attorney, U. S. Department of Justice

STEVEN KLEIN

Acting Crand Jury Reporter

NATIONAL REPORTING INC.

CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTERS

FIVE WORLD TRADE CENTER

NEW YORK, N. Y. 10018

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MICHAEL YANNICELLI, called as a witness, having been duly sworn by the Foreman of the Grand Jury, testified as follows:

BY MR. ABZUG:

- O State your name.
- A Michael Yannicelli.
- Q Spell the last name.
- A Y-a-n-n-i-c-e-l-l-i.
- Q Mr. Yannicelli, my name is Michael D. Abzug, I am a Special Attorney with the United States Department of Justice. You have been subpoensed to testify before this Grand Jury in connection with the Grand Jury's investigation into certain possible violations of Federal law, specifically those laws forbidding public corruption and income tax evasion.

Before we proceed, let me advise you what you rights are under the United States Constitution. You have an absolute right against self-incrimination, anything you say before this Grand Jury can and may be used against you in any type of proceeding whatsoever, do you understand that?

A Yes.

O Secondly, you have an absolute right to counsel; by counsel, I mean lawyer.

Now, you have retained counsel in this matter, have

2 you not?

A Yes.

O His name is Dan Hollman?

A Yes.

Q He is outside in the antercom?

A Yes.

Q In a Grand Jury proceeding the right to counsel is somewhat conditioned. By that I mean Mr. Hollman cannot be present in the Grand Jury room with you, he must remain outside in the anteroom.

However, if during the course of the Grand Jury investigation you wish to consult with Mr. Hollman, you need only indicate your desire to Mr. Krugman, the Grand Jury Foreman seated to your right, he will excuse you to consult with counsel.

I also want to advise you, Mr. Yannicelli, that as
I told your attorney, Mr. Hollman, you are a target of this
Grand Jury investigation.

Now, bearing all that in mind, Mr. Yannicelli, I want to know whether you know an individual by the name of Diorio?

A I refuse to answer on the ground that it will tend to incriminate me.

Q Do you know an individual named Sosh?

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titled to take?

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Q If I continued to ask you questions about your relationship with the individuals that I just mentioned to you, as well as other individuals connected with local law enforcement in Westchester County, will you continue to assert

A I am refusing to arswer. It is the Fifth I am en-

A Do I have to do anything, is it my right to answer?

Q It is your right to invoke the Fifth Amendment under the United States Constitution.

- A You said I don't have to answer?
- Q Is that your intent?

your Fifth / endment privilege?

A The Fifth I am taking if I am entitled to it.

MR. ABZUG: Mr. Foreman, will you temporarily excuse this witness?

THE FOREMAN: You are temporarily excused.

[Witness excused.]

GRAND JURY TESTIMONY OF APPELLANT AUGUST 23, 1976

> United States Courthouse Foley Square New York, New York

28

August 23, 1976 3:00 o'clock p.m.

APPEARANCES:

MICHAEL D. ABZUG,

Special Attorney
U. S. Department of Justice

MEL WINTER, Acting Grand Jury Reporter

NATIONAL REPORTING INC.

CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTERS

FIVE WORLD TRADE CENTER

NEW YORK, N. Y. 10048

[212] 466-1280

MICHAEL YANNICELLI,

called

as a witness, having been duly sworn by the Forelady of the Grand Jury, testified as follows:

BY MR. ABZUG:

O Mr. Yannicelli, my name is Michael D. Abzug. I am a special attorney with the Department of Justice.

You have been subpoensed before this Grand Jury to testify in connection with a Grand Jury investigation into certain possible violations of federal law, specifically those laws prohibiting cambling in violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1955, and conspiring to do so in violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 371.

Specifically, the Grand Jury is interested in the activities of a man known to you by the name of Francis

J. Millow, or Pop Millow.

The scope of this investigation is defined. The scope of this inve

(So marked.)

Q --is defined what I have marked into evidence as Grand Jury's Exhibit 1, and for the record, this is an indictment which charges you and 12 other people with violating Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1955, and Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 371.

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O Now, Mr. Yannicelli, it is going to be the government's position that in light of your plea to the charges contained in what has been marked into evidence as Grand

refuse to answer the questions that have been just posed to you.

Jury's Exhibit 1, you have no Fifth Amendment privilege to

Do you understand that?

A I refuse to answer.

A No.

judge that is sitting will tell you the same thing, that if you continue to refuse to answer questions posed by this Grand Jury, and should the court order you to answer those questions, you will be held in contempt pursuant to Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1826A.

Now, what this means, Mr. Yannicelli, is that you will be held in prison for the life of this Grand Jury, which extends until April 16, 1977, with three possible six-month extensions.

Now, I also want to alvise you that the fact that

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INDICTMENT

EXHIBIT A

A 35

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :

-17-

LAWRENCE CENTORE, a/k/a "Larry Black," MICHAEL YANNICELLI, PETER VARIANO, MICHAEL EVANGELISTA, WILLIAM MURTY, J. MES OSTRANDER, JOHN MONACO, MICHAEL PICCIANO, MICHAEL DEMICHAELS, FRANK GALELLA, ANTHONY RUSSILLO, ALFONSO COLETTI, and HENRY BUCCI, :

INDICTMENT

S 76 Cr. 377

Defendants.

COUNT ONE

The Grand Jury charges:

1. From on or about September 1, 1968, and continuously thereafter up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, in the Southern District of New York, and elsewhere, LAWRENCE CENTORE, a/k/a "Larry Black", MICHAEL YANNICELLI, PETER VARIANO, MICHAEL EVANGELISTA, WILLIAM MURTY, JAMES OSTRANDER, JOHN MONACO, MICHAEL PICCIANO, MICHAEL DEMICHAELS, FRANK GALELLA, ANTHONY RUSSILLO, ALFONSO COLETTI and HENRY BUCCI,

the defendants, and Francis J. Millow, Angelina
David and Morgan Davis, named herein as coconspirators but not as defendants, unlawfully,
wilfully, and knowingly, did combine, conspire,
confederate and agree, together and with each
other and with other persons to the Grand Jury
known and unknown, to commit offenses against the
United States, to wit, to violate Title 18, United
States Code, Section 1955.

- that said defendances would unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly, conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct and own an illegal gambling business, to wit, a sports betting and mutual race horse policy business (a) being in violation of the laws of the State of New York, to wit, New York State Penal Law, Sections 225.05 and 225.10 (b) involving five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct and own a part of said illegal gambling business, and (c) being and remaining in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days and have a gross revenue of two thousand dollars in a single day.
 - 3. Among the means whereby the defendants carried out the conspiracy were the

following:

- a. The defendant MICHAEL YANNICELLI, together with the defendants LAWRENCE CENTORE, a/k/a "Larry Black", and PETER VARIANO, controlled, directed, managed, and supervised the illegal gambling business, which operated at various locations around North Tarrytown, Yonkers, Hastings-on-Hudson, Tuckahoe, Eastchester, lower New Rochelle, and upper Bronx County.
- b. The defendant MICHAEL EVANGELISTA, operated, conducted and managed a wireroom in the premises of 929 East 213th Street, Bronx, New York.
- c. The defendant ALFONSO COL.TTI, operated, conducted and managed a wireroom in the premises of Al's Stationery Store, 95 Beekman Ave., North Tarrytown, New York.
- d. Francis J. Millow, named herein as a co-conspirator but not as a defendant, operated, conducted, and managed a wireroom in the premises of 25 Cedar Street, North Tarrytown, New York.

- e. The wirerooms, including those specified herein, cooperated with and assisted each other in the operation of the illegal gambling business by:
- (i) Accepting sports and mutuel race horse policy wagers from individual bettors not named herein who would telephone the various wirerooms to place their bets;
- (ii) Exchanging information concerning current odds (commonly known as the "line" on sporting events;
- (iii) Relaying and advising each other of recent betting results including the daily winning policy number.
- (iv) Placing and receiving large wagers
 with each other so that no single wireroom would
 be exposed to a large loss (commonly known as
 "laying off");
- (v) Peviewing amounts of money owed to or by bettors or other participants in the illegal gambling business (commonly known as the "play and collects") as a result of their betting activity.

g. The defendants JOHN MONACO, JAMES OSTRANDER, MICHAEL PICCIANO, WILLIAM MURTY, and others not named herein, would collect the

individual bettors.

A 40 betting slips accumulated by the runners in the gambling business at various locations in the Bronx and Westchester Counties. The defendants JOHN MONACO, JAMES OSTRANDER, MICHAEL PICCIANO, and WILLIAM MURTY would meet at various locations in Bronx County, including the vicinity of the intersection of Bronx Boulevard at 239th Street, Bronx, New York, to facilitate the transfer of the accumulated betting slips to a central location, commonly known as a "bank", where the betting slips for each runner would be examined to determine (1) the total amount of wagers placed with the runner, (2) his commission based upon 30% of the total amount of wagers which he collected, (3) the number of winning wagers received as well as the gross amount wagered in the entire operation, and (4) the net profit or loss to the defendants MICHAEL YANNICELLI and PETER VARIANO after the winning wagers, commissions and rents for the various wirerorms were paid.

OVERT ACTS

In furtherance of said conspiracy and to effect the objects thereof, the defendants commit-

ted and caused to be committed, among others, the following over acts in the Southern District of New York:

- 1. In or around December, 1968, the defendant LAWRENCE CENTORE spoke to a co-conspirator whose identity is known to the grand jury in the vicinity of Bruno's Restaurant, Yonkers, New York.
- 2. In or around March, 1969, the defendant LAWRENCE CENTORE spoke to the defendant MICHAEL YANNICELLI.
- 3. In or around August, 1971, the defendant LAWRENCE CENTORE met a co-conspirator whose identity is known to the grand jury at approximately 9:00 a.m., in Yonkers, New York.
- 4. In or around March, 1971, the defendant PETER VARIANO met with co-conspirator Francis J. Millow at the Green Tavern, 14 Main Street, Hastings-on-Hudson, New York.
- 5. In or around May, 1974, the defendants MICHAEL YANNICELLI and PETER VARIANO met with co-conspirator Francis J. Millow in Hastings-on-Hudson, New York.
- 6. In or around August of 1973, the defendants HENRY BUCCI and PETER VARIANO met with

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co-conspirator Francis J. Millow at the Sleepy Hollow High School, North Tarrytown, New York.

- 7. On or about October 20, 1974, the defendant HENRY BUCCI met with co-conspirator Francis J. Millow at approximately 1:00 p.m.
- 8. On or about December 12, 1974, the defendant MICHAEL EVANGELISTA gave the defendant MICHAEL PICCIANO an envelope in the immediate vicinity of 239th Street and Bronx Boulevard, Bronx, New York.
- 9. On or about December 16, 1974, the defendant MICHAEL EVANGELISTA gave the defendant WILLIAM MURTY an envelope in the immediate vicinity of 949 East 214 Street, Bronx, New York.
- 10. On or about December 18, 1974, the defendants WILLIAM MURTY, MICHAEL PICCIANO and JAMES OSTRANDER met in the immediate vicinity of Bronx Boulevard and 239th Street, Bronx, New York.
- 11. In or around December, 1974, the defendant JOHN MONACO introduced the defendant WILLIAM MURTY to Christine Romeo.
- 12. On or about December 21, 1974, the defendant JOHN MONACO handed the defendant JAMES

OSTRANDER at least five envelopes in Bronx County, New York.

- 13. On or about December 31, 1974, the defendant MICHAEL EVANGELISTA entered the premises of 929 East 213th Street, Bronx, New York.
- 14. In or around May, 1972, the defendant MICHAEL DeMICHAELS met in Hastings-on-Hudson, New York, with a co-conspirator whose identity is known to the grand jury.
- 15. In or around July, 1972, the defendant MICHAEL DeMICHAELS had a conversation in Hastings-on-Hudson, New York, with a co-conspirator whose identity is known to the grand jury.
- 16. On or about November 13, 1974, the defendant FRANK GALELLA had a conversation with co-conspirator Francis J. Millow.
- 17. On or about December 7, 1974, the defendant FRANK GALELLA had a conversation with co-conspirator Francis J. Millow.
- 18. On or about November 22, 1974, the defendant ALFONSO COLETTI had a conversation with co-conspirator Francis J. Millow.
 - 19. On or about December 4, 1974, the

defendant ALFONSO COLETTI had a conversation with co-conspirator Francis J. Millow.

- 20. On or about November 14, 1974, the defendant ANTHONY RUSSILLO had a conversation with co-conspirator Francis J. Millow.
- 21. On or about November 28, 1974, the defendant ANTHONY RUSSILLO had a conversation with co-conspirator Francis J. Millow

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 371).

COUNT TWO

The Grand Jury further charges:

From on or about April 15, 1971,

and continuously thereafter up to and including
the date of the filing of this indictment, in the
Southern District of New York and elsewhere,

LAWRENCE CENTORE, a/k/a "Larry Black", MICHAEL
YANNICELLI, PETER VARIANO, MICHAEL EVANGELISTA,

WILLIAM MURTY, JAMES OSTRANDER, JOHN MONACO,

MICHAEL PICCIANO, MICHAEL DEMICHAELS, FRANK GALELLA,
ANTHONY RUSSILLO, ALFONSO COLETTI and HENRY BUCCI,
the defendants, unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly,
did conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct

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and own an illegal gambling business, to wit, a sports betting and mitue) race horse policy business (a) being in violation of the laws of the State of New York, to wit, New York State Penal Law, Sections 225.05 and 225.10, (b) involving five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct and won a part of said illegal gaming business, and (c) remaining in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days, and having a gross revenue of two thousand dollars in a single day.

(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1955 and 2.)

Foreman

ROBERT B. FISKE, Jr. United States Attorney

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